The Risks of Shareholder Deadlock in Vietnam: Why 50/50 Does Not Always Mean a Veto

The Risks of Shareholder Deadlock in Vietnam: Why 50/50 Does Not Always Mean a Veto

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PCA Attorneys | Legal & Compliance Practice

Introduction

A 50/50 joint venture looks perfectly balanced on paper. Each shareholder owns the same economic interest and major decisions are expected to be made by consensus. In practice, however, disagreement over management, financing, dividends, strategy or key appointments can quickly turn that balance into corporate paralysis.

Instead, Vietnamese law relies on quorum rules, voting thresholds, limited statutory exit rights and, importantly, the company’s own Charter. This makes corporate structuring particularly important.

Article Outline

  • 1. No automatic “shotgun” mechanism
  • 2. Quorum Traps In Vietnamese Corporate Governance
  • 3. Practical case: when a 50/50 boycott backfires
  • 4. Joint-stock companies: similar quorum risk, plus the Chairman
  • 5. Statutory exit rights exist — but they are narrow
  • 6. Can a Court or arbitration solve the deadlock?
  • 7. Draft the solution before the dispute
  • The PCA View
  1. No automatic “shotgun” mechanism

Vietnam’s corporate framework is principally governed by the Law on Enterprises No. 59/2020/QH14, as amended, including by Law No. 76/2025/QH15 effective from 1 July 2025.

Article 207 lists the statutory grounds for dissolution. Shareholder deadlock is not identified as a separate ground. Voluntary dissolution may be approved by the competent corporate body, but where shareholders cannot obtain the required votes, the deadlock may itself prevent that solution.

Accordingly, where investors want a Russian roulette, shotgun, Texas shoot-out, put/call or other forced-exit mechanism, it should be agreed before the relationship deteriorates.

  1. The quorum trap in a Vietnamese LLC

The most counter-intuitive situation often arises in a Vietnamese multi-member limited liability company (“LLC”).

Under Article 58, the first Members’ Council meeting normally requires members representing at least 65% of charter capital. If it cannot proceed, the second meeting may be held with members representing at least 50%. If the second meeting also fails, the third meeting can proceed regardless of the percentage of charter capital represented, unless the Charter provides otherwise.

Article 59 then provides, as a default rule, that ordinary resolutions at a meeting require approval from members holding at least 65% of the capital represented by the members attending the meeting. Certain major matters require 75%.

  1. Practical case: when a 50/50 boycott backfires

Assume Foreign Investor A owns 50% of a Vietnamese LLC and Investor B owns the remaining 50%. A serious dispute develops. B believes that refusing to attend Members’ Council meetings will prevent A from passing any resolution.

At the first meeting, B’s strategy works: A’s 50% does not satisfy the statutory 65% quorum. At the second properly convened meeting, however, A’s 50% is sufficient to satisfy the 50% quorum.

If A is the only member attending, A represents 100% of the capital represented at that meeting. Subject to the Charter, the agenda, proper meeting procedures and any other applicable restrictions, resolutions calculated by reference to the capital represented at the meeting may therefore become capable of adoption.

In other words:

In some Vietnamese 50/50 LLCs, boycotting meetings can potentially weaken rather than protect the supposedly ‘blocking’ shareholder.

There is also an important distinction for written resolutions. Article 59(5) requires approval by members holding at least 65% of the charter capital for a written resolution, unless the Charter provides another ratio. A 50% member therefore cannot, as a default rule, reproduce the same strategy through written consent.

  1. Joint-stock companies: similar quorum risk, plus the Chairman

For a Vietnamese joint-stock company (“JSC”), Article 145 provides that the first General Meeting normally requires shareholders representing more than 50% of the voting rights.

A second meeting can proceed with at least 33%, while a third meeting can proceed irrespective of the percentage represented.

Under Article 148, ordinary resolutions generally require more than 50% of the votes represented by attending shareholders, while specified important matters require at least 65%.

At Board level, there is another important asymmetry.

Under Article 157(12), unless the Charter requires a higher threshold, Board decisions are adopted by a majority of directors attending. Where votes are equal, the side supported by the Chairman prevails.

Two shareholders may therefore be economically equal while one enjoys materially greater practical governance power because it controls the chairmanship or Board composition.

50/50 ownership does not necessarily mean 50/50 control.

  1. Statutory exit rights exist — but they are narrow

For an LLC, Article 51 allows a member who voted against certain resolutions to request that the company repurchase its capital contribution.

The statutory cases include amendments to Charter provisions concerning members’ rights and obligations, company reorganisation and — importantly — other circumstances specifically provided in the Charter. The request must generally be made within 15 days, and payment remains subject to the company being able to satisfy its debts and other property obligations.

For a JSC, Article 132 provides a comparable right where a shareholder voted against a resolution concerning company reorganisation or changes to shareholder rights and obligations under the Charter. The request must be made within 10 days. The law also provides rules for valuation and purchase within 90 days, subject to the solvency requirements of Article 134.

These rights can be extremely useful.

They do not, however, create a general right to exit simply because trust between shareholders has collapsed.

  1. Can a Court or arbitration solve the deadlock?

Vietnamese law allows shareholders to challenge resolutions adopted unlawfully and/or contrary to the Charter.

In an LLC, qualifying members may request cancellation of a Members’ Council resolution where the meeting procedure, conditions or content violate the applicable regulations or the Charter.

For a JSC, Article 151 similarly permits qualifying shareholders to request that a Court or arbitral tribunal cancel a General Meeting resolution on specified procedural or substantive grounds within 90 days.

These remedies are essential where one shareholder abuses corporate procedure. They do not, however, replace a missing commercial exit mechanism.

  1. Draft the solution before the dispute

This is where careful structuring becomes fundamental.

Article 24 of the Law on Enterprises expressly requires the company Charter to address both the procedure for adopting company decisions and the principles for resolving internal disputes. It also requires the Charter to address circumstances in which members or shareholders may request a company buy-back.

A properly structured joint venture should therefore define, at minimum:

  • what constitutes a Deadlock Matter;
  • which matters are Reserved Matters requiring unanimity or super-majority approval;
  • an escalation procedure between senior representatives;
  • a negotiation or mediation period;
  • an agreed valuation methodology; and
  • a final exit mechanism if the deadlock remains unresolved.

Depending on the transaction, that final mechanism might involve a put/call, shotgun procedure, sealed-bid process, independent valuation or an agreed sale of the entire business.

Most importantly, the Shareholders’ Agreement and the Vietnamese Charter should be aligned and reviewed as an integrated governance framework, with both documents remaining subject to mandatory Vietnamese law. A sophisticated mechanism contained only in an offshore-style SHA, while the Charter contains inconsistent governance provisions, may create uncertainty as to its implementation and enforceability in Vietnam.

The PCA View

A 50/50 shareholding should never be mistaken for a complete governance framework.

In Vietnam, the real balance of power depends not only on percentages, but also on the Charter, quorum rules, voting thresholds, Board composition, Chairman, legal representative, Reserved Matters and contractual exit architecture. The best time to solve a shareholder dispute is therefore before the dispute begins.

For investors establishing or acquiring a Vietnamese joint venture, deadlock provisions should be treated as part of the core transaction structure — not as boilerplate buried at the back of a Shareholders’ Agreement.

This publication is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The appropriate governance and deadlock mechanism depends on the company’s legal form, Charter, ownership structure, investment status and the circumstances of the relevant shareholders.

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Author: Mr. Lê N. Bao, Group CEO – PCA

Tags: #ShareholderDeadlock, #CorporateGovernance, #JointVentureVietnam, #BusinessCompliance, #VietnamCorporateLaw, #DisputeResolution, #ForeignInvestment

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